Learning to perceive in the sensorimotor approach: Piagetâ€™s theory of equilibration interpreted dynamically by Ezequiel Alejandro Di Paolo et al.
HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE
HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY ARTICLE
published: 30 July 2014
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00551
Learning to perceive in the sensorimotor approach: Piaget’s
theory of equilibration interpreted dynamically
Ezequiel Alejandro Di Paolo1,2,3*, Xabier E. Barandiaran2,4, Michael Beaton2,3 and Thomas Buhrmann2
1 Ikerbasque, Basque Foundation for Science, Bizkaia, Spain
2 IAS-Research Center for Life, Mind, and Society, Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, University of the Basque Country, San Sebastián, Spain
3 Centre for Computational Neuroscience and Robotics, Department of Informatics, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK
4 Department of Philosophy, University School of Social Work, UPV/EHU University of the Basque Country, San Sebastián, Spain
Edited by:
Andrew D. Wilson, Leeds
Metropolitan University, UK
Reviewed by:
Cyril R. Pernet, University of
Edinburgh, UK
Erik Myin, Antwerp University,
Belgium
*Correspondence:
Ezequiel Alejandro Di Paolo,
Department of Logic and
Philosophy of Science, University of
the Basque Country, UPV/EHU, Av
de Tolosa 70, 20018 San Sebastián,
Spain
e-mail: ezequiel@sussex.ac.uk
Learning to perceive is faced with a classical paradox: if understanding is required for
perception, how can we learn to perceive something new, something we do not yet
understand? According to the sensorimotor approach, perception involves mastery of
regular sensorimotor co-variations that depend on the agent and the environment, also
known as the “laws” of sensorimotor contingencies (SMCs). In this sense, perception
involves enacting relevant sensorimotor skills in each situation. It is important for this
proposal that such skills can be learned and refined with experience and yet up to this
date, the sensorimotor approach has had no explicit theory of perceptual learning. The
situation is made more complex if we acknowledge the open-ended nature of human
learning. In this paper we propose Piaget’s theory of equilibration as a potential candidate
to fulfill this role. This theory highlights the importance of intrinsic sensorimotor norms,
in terms of the closure of sensorimotor schemes. It also explains how the equilibration of
a sensorimotor organization faced with novelty or breakdowns proceeds by re-shaping
pre-existing structures in coupling with dynamical regularities of the world. This way
learning to perceive is guided by the equilibration of emerging forms of skillful coping
with the world. We demonstrate the compatibility between Piaget’s theory and the
sensorimotor approach by providing a dynamical formalization of equilibration to give an
explicit micro-genetic account of sensorimotor learning and, by extension, of how we learn
to perceive. This allows us to draw important lessons in the form of general principles for
open-ended sensorimotor learning, including the need for an intrinsic normative evaluation
by the agent itself. We also explore implications of our micro-genetic account at the
personal level.
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INTRODUCTION
The sensorimotor approach to perceptual experience (O’Regan
and Noë, 2001; Noë, 2004) proposes that at the root of percep-
tion there always lies a skilful engagement with the world, with
an emphasis on the active connotation of the verb to engage.
More specifically, perception involves the mastery of the laws of
sensorimotor contingencies (SMCs), those regular sensorimotor
co-variations that depend on the environment, the agent’s body,
the agent’s internal (neural) dynamics, and the task context and
norms.
While the proposal has seen no small amount of con-
troversy and debate over the last decade, only recently have
attempts been made to produce a formal theoretical frame-
work to express the various claims of the theory, the rela-
tion between its proposed concepts, and the implications for
experimental and modeling/robotic work. The very notion
of SMCs, the core concept of the theory, had no for-
mal expression in dynamical systems terms until a recent
mathematical formalization was introduced by Buhrmann et al.
(2013).
The goal of the current paper is to proceed along similar
lines of theoretical development and examine another central,
and heretofore neglected, aspect of the sensorimotor approach:
perceptual learning.
What we can perceive seems to rely on the level of embod-
ied know-how that we possess and are able to enact. And yet,
although the primary literature discusses various examples of skill
acquisition and adaptation to sensorimotor disruptions, it has
to date offered no explicit theory of perceptual learning. Such a
theory would have to account for how it is possible to perceive
anything new if perception relies on pre-existing sensorimotor
skills. Moreover, it would also have to account for the seemingly
open-ended character of human perceptual learning, which is
able to exceed any prescribed set of relevant species-ecological
criteria by constantly opening up novel domains of significance
(e.g., wine-tasting, refined construction of musical instruments).
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Various developments of the theory have modeled aspects of this
process (e.g., Philipona et al., 2003, 2004; Maye and Engel, 2011,
2013). However, it can still be said that the SMC approach lacks
theoretical resources to operationally address questions such as:
• By what mechanisms is mastery of SMCs acquired?
• What counts as having acquired sufficient know-how of SMCs?
What counts as mastery?
• How is it possible to learn to perceive anything new if percep-
tion itself always relies on existing knowledge of SMCs, as the
theory claims?
• How do various sensorimotor organizations relate to each
other in the same agent?
• What kind of cognitive organizational principles can help sus-
tain SMCs in a flexible, open-ended manner?
In order to address questions like these, SMC theory requires
an explicit theory of learning. For reasons discussed below,
we propose Piaget’s theory of equilibration as a suitable start-
ing point. In order to demonstrate the compatibility and vari-
ous complementarities between this and SMC theories, we re-
formulate Piaget’s proposal in dynamical systems terms that
render it compatible with the dynamical definitions of SMCs
(Buhrmann et al., 2013), thus further contributing to the formal-
ization of the SMC approach.
In particular, from the dynamical account of Piagetian sensori-
motor learning we derive some principles for the organization and
open-ended acquisition of SMCs. There is a vast literature on skill
acquisition, cognitive development and learning in psychology
(e.g., Speelman and Kirsner, 2005), on plasticity of different
kinds in neuroscience (e.g., Sirois et al., 2008), and on models of
learning in AI and robotics (e.g., Floreano et al., 2008). However,
the objective here is not to provide a thorough review but to focus
on feasible ways to solve the problem of open-ended learning in
SMC theory at least in the form of general necessary principles
and other requirements.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The two following
sections set the conceptual background, before we turn to a
formal development of the theory. We first discuss the central role
of understanding within SMC theory. After that we clarify that
perceptual learning is centrally important to SMC theory, but that
a worked out account of this process is missing; it also highlights
the fundamental difficulty of accounting for perceptual learning,
in any theory that tightly links perception and understanding,
as SMC theory does. Next, we introduce the Piagetian theory of
equilibration as a promising candidate from which the missing
sensorimotor theory of learning can be developed. Section 5
translates Piaget’s theory into a modern dynamical systems for-
mulation and establishes the strict compatibility with the dynam-
ical operationalization of SMCs provided by Buhrmann et al.
(2013). We then derive a list of necessary (but probably not suf-
ficient) principles for open-ended learning architectures. Finally,
we discuss what has been achieved, and return to the problems for
sensorimotor theory raised at the beginning of the paper.
THE ROLE OF UNDERSTANDING IN SENSORIMOTOR THEORY
SMC theory emphasizes the claim that all perceiving involves
understanding (Noë, 1999, 2004; O’Regan and Noë, 2001). This
is not to say that abstract, disengaged reasoning is required. The
claim is that the practical, engaged, sensorimotor skills of the
whole subject are required, for perception. This is the practical
sense of the word understanding, which we will adopt throughout
this paper.
To see what this means, consider Kohler’s (1951 [1964]) work,
involving long-term adaptation to vision-inverting prisms and
lenses. Initially, on putting on such devices, the world stopped
making sense to Kohler’s subjects: objects moved around in com-
pletely unexpected ways, solid objects no longer even appeared
solid, but rather rubbery and distorted, and changeable in size
and shape (Kohler, 1951 [1964], pp. 64–65). Nevertheless, for
subjects who actively engaged with the world, after a long period
of using such devices, the world slowly righted itself. Firstly
actions became more and more correct, and eventually perception
itself became more and more correct. It is notable that: (a)
the adaptations, both behavioral and perceptual, were partial;
and (b) they were very situation-dependent: subjects came to
perceive correctly only in those situations where they had practice.
Note also that Kohler’s subjects often used explicit strategies to
react correctly in the initial stages of rehabituation, but that
these strategies eventually became implicit, and automatic; and
concomitantly, the visual world itself came to look more and more
normal.
These experiments indicate that perceptual experience involves
practical understanding. In this case, practical, engaged knowl-
edge of how to move and navigate in 3D space is required for
experience of 3D space. Note, in particular, that the understand-
ing involved in perceiving space is not just an isolated, automatic
happening. Rather, our perception of 3D space (and, on this view,
all of our perception) depends on our overall ability to understand
and make sense of the world around us. This is why we describe
the successfully adapted subject as following “implicit” strategies,
to emphasize this continued involvement of whole-agent sense-
making, which can become explicit again if required (as Kohler’s
experiments show) even in what is normally thought of as “low-
level” experience.
THE PARADOX OF PERCEPTUAL LEARNING
This emphasis on understanding in making perception possible
leads to an apparent paradox of learning for SMC theory (and for
any theory which tightly links perception to understanding). If
understanding is required for perception, how can a subject learn
to perceive something new, which they do not yet understand?
The contrary claim (e.g., Roskies, 2008) is that the very existence
of perceptual learning shows that some experience must outstrip
our current understanding.
This is an old philosophical problem. It closely resembles the
foundational problem of epistemology as expressed by Plato in
the Meno. In trying to determine the essence of virtue Socrates
admits not knowing what it is but invites Meno to inquire,
together with him, into its nature. Meno asks how will they
manage to search for something of whose nature they know
nothing at all; how will they even recognize it if they find it?
Marjorie Grene, following Merleau-Ponty’s and Michael Polanyi’s
conceptions of practical, embodied knowledge, comments that
the structure of Meno’s problem is particularly puzzling, not
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to say unsolvable, if we assume that knowledge must be fully
explicit (Grene, 1966, pp. 23–24) (Closely related points, to do
with the nature of rule-following, have also been made by Carroll,
1895 and Wittgenstein, 1953/2001 §§185–242). However, Grene
argues, the problem does not involve any logical contradictions
once we admit the possibility of knowledge or understanding
having degrees of explicitation, from what we can verbalize, to the
practical knowledge that we tacitly embody in our everyday skills.
The solution to the problem of perceptual learning may be sought
in between fully achieved understanding and total ignorance,
along a “continuous” space of different degrees of skilful coping
with the world.
To resolve this paradox, we need a worked out theory of
perceptual learning that builds on the above suggestions. We will
now argue that although SMC theory relies on the possibility of
perceptual learning, it currently lacks such a worked out theory.
Learning is explicitly mentioned at a few key points in
the primary SMC literature. Firstly, as discussed above, the
case of adaptation to inverting prisms (Kohler, 1951 [1964])
is seen as an important verification of the theory, especially
given that adaptations only occur in the context of active,
personal effort by the subject to remaster their visual world.
Learning is also important in the discussion of cortical defer-
ence vs. cortical dominance given by Hurley and Noë (2003).
Here, the issue is that of whether given modalities of experi-
ence are always supported by given brain regions. Hurley and
Noë discuss several relevant empirical findings, including the
very striking experiments on ferret pups carried out by Roe
et al. (1990), in which it is shown that the auditory cortex can
come to subserve visual experience, given early enough surgical
intervention.
Another example of cortical deference occurs in tactile-visual
sensory substitution (TVSS). Here, the image from a camera is
fed to a 2D array of vibrating touch actuators on the body. In
early experiments (Bach-y-Rita, 1967) this was a relatively large
array, placed on the subject’s back. In more recent experiments
(Sampaio et al., 2001), smaller arrays are situated on the subject’s
tongue. Strikingly, subjects who are passively “shown” the world
via this system do not learn to perceive anything new. In contrast,
those who are allowed to use the camera to actively explore the
world can begin to get a sense that the system is providing visual-
style access to the world within only a small number of days of
training (Guarniero, 1974). Hurley and Noë (2003) argue that
there is a distinctively visual phenomenology to this new way of
experiencing of the world—even though it is of course not nearly
as detailed as normal vision, lacks color, and so on. If this is
correct, then this is another case of cortical deference: the areas of
the brain that normally subserve touch are now subserving visual
experience.
Hurley and Noë’s (2003) general point is that, if SMC theory is
correct, cortical deference should be the norm; the brain region is
not what matters, what matters is the sensorimotor coordinations
which the brain region helps to enable. As long as the subject can
learn the relevant, new coordinations, the relevant, new type of
experience will emerge.
These discussions show the importance of learning for SMC
theory, but they also show that SMC theory does not, yet, explain
how perceptual learning can take place, it just presupposes that
it can. Thus, we now turn to Piaget’s work, which we believe can
be integrated with SMC theory to provide the resolution to this
problem.
PIAGET’S THEORY OF EQUILIBRATION
Within his broader framework of equilibration theory, Piaget
has addressed the main difficulties of the problem of perceptual
learning (Piaget, 1936, 1947, 1969, 1975; Chapman, 1992, see also
Boom, 2009; the relevant literature is large and we only evaluate
the theory in its basic form). In this section we briefly go over
the central points of Piaget’s research program, which needs to
be seen precisely as the quest to determine how abstract and
explicit (e.g., conceptual, mathematical, formal, rational) human
capacities of understanding stem from early and less explicit
forms of sensorimotor organization. The set of developmental
transitions that span this continuum are conceptualized under
the general notion of adaptation, which itself is seen as a process
of equilibration between assimilation and accommodation pro-
cesses. These notions present us with a suitable candidate solution
for the problem of perceptual learning for, as we will see, they
assume the possibility of different degrees of explicitation and
kinds of understanding.
Following the standard interpretation, by assimilation we refer
to a process by which an environmental aspect (a perturbation,
a new object, or a novel situation, etc.) is integrated, coupled
or absorbed into an existing physiological (metabolic, muscular,
etc.) or cognitive/behavioral (sensorimotor, perceptual, reflex-
ive) scheme or structure. In Piaget’s famous example (Piaget,
1936, 1947) a baby assimilates the mother’s nipple into a suck-
ling reflex (itself a sensorimotor structure involving a complex
of muscular coordinations, proprioceptive, tactile, temperature
and taste sensory feedback, etc.). But a propensity to suck
does not typically equate to immediate sucking skill. The baby
has to learn to “latch on” successfully, to become comfortable
with the shape and feel of her own mother’s breast. That is,
the baby has to learn new patterns of sensorimotor organi-
zation. In Piaget’s notation, an agent’s coordination structure
A assimilates an environmental aspect A′, that in turn leads
to the coordination B that demands and assimilates B′ in a
sequence scheme, or organization, expressed as A × A′ → B;
B × B′ → C; C × C′ → . . .. In terms of the example, A
can denote suckling and A′ the mother’s breast, B swallow-
ing and B′ the milk, C breathing and C′ air, etc. Note that
for Piaget the environment is not a set of pre-existing stim-
ulus conditions that impact on the organism to produce a
perceptual or cognitive effect. Only what can be assimilated
in an already existing scheme or sensorimotor coordination
pattern (i.e., an action or operation of the subject) can be
perceived.
By accommodation Piaget refers to the process by which the
physiological or cognitive scheme or structure is modulated
or transformed to facilitate or encompass a not-yet-assimilated
aspect of the environment. So, for instance, the suckling senso-
rimotor coordination of the baby gets progressively attuned to
the size, texture and shape of the nipple. So, variations of A get
progressively attuned to variations in A′.
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Equilibration is the process by which a given cognitive or
biological organization, as a result of a maturational process or
in the presence of an ever changing environment or any internal
sources of tension, reaches a new form of organizational stability.
Piaget denotes the stability of the organization as the closure of
a cycle of sensorimotor engagements: A × A′ → B; B × B′ →
C; C × C′ → . . . → Z; Z × Z′ → A. We refer to this cycle as
a sensorimotor scheme or organization. Even though the simple
cycle is the paradigmatic case, Piaget allows for the possibility
of additional complexity (short-circuits, intersections between
cycles, etc., Piaget, 1975, p. 10). He hints at the fact that ultimately
a cycle should be understood as conservation of the conditions
of viability of an organism or a cognitive system as a whole
(ibid., p. 11). In a similar manner to that discussed in current
work in the enactive approach (Di Paolo, 2005, 2009; Thomp-
son, 2007; Barandiaran, 2008; Di Paolo et al., 2010; Di Paolo
and Thompson, 2014), it is the conservation of a self-sustaining
circular organization that can be proposed as grounding aspects of
normativity. In this case, the evaluation of whether equilibration
occurs (or not) corresponds to the cycle closing back on itself
(or not).
A sensorimotor organization that has undergone processes of
equilibration will potentially be affected by higher-order internal
tensions this may have generated, as well as by new possibil-
ities for action that have been brought about by the adaptive
changes involved in its accommodation. For instance, if a baby has
acquired a suckling skill and is now presented with a milk-bottle
for the first time, she now faces the challenge, and opportunity,
of accommodating a new object with new properties (texture,
friction, shape, etc.). These differences induce instabilities in the
suckling organization scheme. As a result, a new accommodation
process is triggered, and repeated exposure to these conditions can
lead, by the interplay between assimilation and accommodation,
to a new equilibration of the suckling sensorimotor organization
and eventually splitting it into two broad categories: A1 × A′1→ B1; B1 × B′1 → . . ., corresponding to breastfeeding and
A2 × A′2 → B2; B2 × B′2 → . . ., corresponding to suckling
from the milk-bottle. This new equilibration where milk-bottle
feeding is stabilized might open new possibilities for action: the
milk bottle affords grasping, new feeding positions are available,
etc.
A more radical equilibration process might result from the
development of the baby’s muscular and sensorimotor capacities.
When the baby starts to grasp objects and bring them to her
mouth, the suckling coordination might sometimes be triggered
in an assimilation attempt. But subsequent sensorimotor coor-
dinations may be severely challenged if the object, say a puppet,
is incompatible with the enacted coordination. The inability to
assimilate this new object, and to force an impossible accommo-
dation upon the suckling scheme, may then lead to a higher order
equilibration where sensorimotor organizations are now split into
suckable and non-suckable (yet graspable, movable, chewable,
etc.) patterns. A further equilibration process might result from
an increasingly stabilized habit of bringing the thumb or a dummy
to the mouth so as to assimilate it into the suckling scheme as
breastfeeding becomes less frequent. In turn, this new assimilation
A3 × A′3 might now lead to a modification of the swallowing
coordination transforming the original sequence A × A′ → B;
B × B′ → . . . into A3 × A′3 → B3; B3 × B′3 → . . . that might
later be further transformed into a repetitive biting pattern when
teeth start to grow, resulting in A4 × A′4 → B4; B4 × B′4 → . . ..
These processes of differentiation of sensorimotor organization
schemes, their grouping and branching, sequential ordering, etc.
lead to higher order equilibrations that are richer in diversity
and combinatorial potential than what the previously existing
cognitive organization made possible.
Piaget describes two kinds of perturbations that may be
encountered by an established sensorimotor or cognitive scheme:
obstacles (contradictions or disturbances) and lacunae (gaps in
the current organization) (Piaget, 1975; Boom, 2009). Both types
are manifested in the concrete encounter between agent and
world regardless of whether they originate from changes in the
world or from internal contradictions (for instance, in the case
of conflicting sensorimotor schemes). This is important because
Piaget’s theory implies, but perhaps does not emphasize enough,
that encounters with the world (i.e., obstacles and lacunae) drive
equilibration and there is always a possibility that the world
may “guide” part of the equilibration process (c.f. Beaton, 2014).
The theory might otherwise be interpreted as too internalistic,
relying only on the reorganization and adjustment of existing
sensorimotor coordinations. Maximal equilibration corresponds
to the situation in which a sensorimotor or cognitive organization
already anticipates all potential obstacles and lacunae. The latter
have no disturbing effect because the cognitive structure has
already fully adapted to them. In other words, maximal equili-
bration would be that (unattainable) state where the enactment
of sensorimotor schemes required no further accommodation to
the world.
It is important to note that equilibration processes are not lim-
ited to agent-environment dynamics. Piaget distinguishes three
broad categories of equilibration:
1. Forms of equilibration that involve interactions between agent
and environment and result from dis-equilibrium between
coordination processes A, B, C, . . . and environmental aspects
A′, B′, C′.
2. Those due to the reciprocal accommodation and assimilation
between sensorimotor or cognitive schemes, so tensions due
to the inability to assimilate or accommodate sequences or
relationships of the form (A, B, C) ↔ (X, Y, Z) lead to new
forms of adaptation (A1, B1, C1)↔ (X1, Y1, Z1).
3. Forms of equilibration that result from tensions between a
particular scheme and the system’s totality. This is, according
to Piaget, a new form of equilibration, since it involves a
hierarchical dimension of relationships among schemes or
subsystems.
Piaget’s framework provides a progressive microgenetic concep-
tion of the changes that make cognitive development possible.
This is important for the problem of perceptual learning. Con-
ceiving of understanding as something that can only be either
present or absent leads to the Platonic conundrum: I can only
perceive what lies in front of me if I understand it with the
categories and skills I already posses; yet new categorizations
are required to perceive something new and there seems to be
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no source of categories other than those I had before. In con-
trast, a microgenetic approach works on a graded conception of
understanding and so it allows us to specify the mechanisms and
processes involved in the gradual emergence of new perceptual
categories, habits, organized sensorimotor schemes and opera-
tions from pre-existing ones. Piaget’s development of the theory,
particularly along its notation system, lacks a detailed dynamical
systems formalization that can make justice to the microgenetic
learning and equilibration processes he conceptualized.
A DYNAMICAL APPROACH TO EQUILIBRATION
In order to evaluate whether Piaget’s framework can serve as the
missing learning theory for the SMC approach, our strategy is to
describe Piaget’s ideas in modern dynamical systems terms and
relate those with our previous dynamical definitions of SMCs
(Buhrmann et al., 2013).
We do not propose here to offer a full dynamical systems
account of Piaget’s theory of equilibration. But we will demon-
strate how a dynamical systems interpretation of this theory,
even if only partial, can act as a common language between
Piaget and SMC theory. Both theories share the view that a
perceptual situation is constituted by the coordinations that an
agent is currently engaged in through its interaction with its
surroundings (the deployment of skillful sensorimotor coping)
and the possibilities for action that the situation makes possible
for that particular agent and its skills or set of sensorimotor
capacities. However, the point where SMC theory remains mostly
silent is, as we have argued, exactly where Piaget has put his focus:
the transformation of these coordinations and schemes. And,
reciprocally, the sensorimotor approach has been formulated at
a level of detail and attention to embodied and situated aspects
of cognition that can complement some of Piaget’s proposals or
suggest new interpretations.
We first recapitulate the dynamical systems interpretation of
SMCs given in Buhrmann et al. (2013).
For the sensorimotor approach, perception relies on regular-
ities in the sensorimotor flow, that is, on SMCs. The concept of
SMCs refers to “lawful” co-variations of sensory stimulation and
motor activity. For example, the projection of a horizontal line
onto the retina changes from a straight line to a curved arc as
one shifts the eye’s fixation point from the line itself to points
above or below it. In contrast, if the focus is moved along the
line no such transformation takes place. The geometry of the
viewed object, the morphology of the retina, and the particular
movement pattern employed, all determine regularities in sensory
stimulation (O’Regan and Noë, 2001, p. 941). However, what
counts as sensorimotor dependence varies if we focus on all
possible scenarios given the details of the agent’s sensory and
motor systems and its environment, or if we study the agent as
the partial creator of such regularities, or if we consider different
task-oriented scenarios.
To account for these possibilities, Buhrmann et al. (2013)
propose four formal concepts of SMCs, and describe them in
dynamical systems terms. These are: sensorimotor environment,
sensorimotor habitat, sensorimotor coordination, and sensorimotor
strategy. The sensorimotor environment is the set of possible
sensory changes induced by arbitrary (open-loop) motor activity.
It depends on the structure of the environment and the details
of the agent’s embodiment, but not on the internal activity that
regulates the agent’s behavior. It can be used to determine senso-
rimotor invariants such as relevant symmetries and asymmetries
(e.g., the retina example). The sensorimotor habitat is again a
general mapping, but taking into account the closed-loop situated
agent, i.e., how the agent itself induces motor changes and how
these changes affect sensory activity. The first two sensorimotor
structures are general in the sense that they are supposed to
map the full spectrum of possibilities for a given agent and
situation. The next two sensorimotor structures are more specific.
A sensorimotor coordination describes particular sensorimotor
patterns that are reliably used in performing a task. These can
be cycles or transients in sensorimotor space and depend on
the environment, the body, the inner activity, and the task-
related context. Finally, sensorimotor strategies are organizations
of several sensorimotor coordinations, which are subject to some
normative framework (for instance, considerations of efficiency
or fluency).
These concepts are formalized as functional mappings involv-
ing variables such as the activity of sensors and motors, internal
(neural) activity, relative positioning and configuration of the
body, and so on.
In Piaget’s terminology, sensorimotor coordinations in the
SMC sense correspond rather straightforwardly to the patterns
of coordinations grouped under the labels A, B, C, . . . that form
the organism’s side of the pairings that when organized in a cycle
compose a sensorimotor sequence scheme or organization. The
latter total scheme or organization corresponds to one kind of
sensorimotor strategy according to the terminology of Buhrmann
et al. (2013). The environmental responses A′, B′, C′, . . ., again
in Piagetian terms, are also taken into account in the dynamical
formulation of SMCs (ibid.) through an equation describing
the environmental intrinsic and responsive dynamics. These and
other aspects of terminology are summarized in Table 1.
Although comparable with Piaget’s cyclic organizations, sen-
sorimotor strategies also refer to more detailed aspects of senso-
rimotor order that remain implicit in the theory of equilibration.
For example, sensorimotor strategies need not present a circular
organization at the level of sensorimotor coordinations. This is
because their normativity can be grounded elsewhere, either in
the self-constitution of the organism in the enactive approach (Di
Paolo, 2005; Thompson, 2007; Di Paolo et al., 2010) or in norms
originating externally that the organism incorporates (efficiency
in labor time, craftsmanship, performance, etc.). For these rea-
sons, sensorimotor strategies can be more complex than cycles,
but it is nevertheless possible to apply the notions of assimilation
and accommodation by adopting a criterion of equilibration that
follows the organismic or the externally imposed norm.
Barring these differences, that might later be exploited to
inform the Piagetian approach, it seems so far that Buhrmann
et al.’s (2013) dynamical approach to SMCs promises to establish
a compatibility between equilibration and SMC theories. What
remains to be seen is how we interpret the concepts of assimila-
tion, accommodation, and maximal equilibration in these terms.
First, we look again at equilibration, describing it as simply as
possible in dynamical terms.
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Table 1 | Summary of Piagetian and dynamical systems concepts for a theory of equilibration.
Piagetian concept DS definition Notation Example
SM coordination
scheme
Class of SM coordinations, defined e.g., by region in SM
space, task constraints, etc.
A, B, C. . . The class of movements and sensations that
belong to the subject’s experience of
pushing objects toward the ground;
absorbing impacts with the hands etc.
Environmental
response structure
Those environmental variables most directly affecting the
sensory variables in A, B, C. i.e., the projection of the
whole dynamic system, when engaged in SM
coordinations A, B, C, onto relevant environmental
variables.
A′, B′, C′. . . Sound of the ball hitting the floor; height of
the ball above ground; force exerted by the
ball on the hand
SM coordination Instance of SM coordination belonging to class A, B. . .,
i.e., a trajectory in SM space that belongs to the
respective SM coordination class.
a(t), b(t), . . . A particular instance of pushing the ball
towards the ground
Environmental
response
Instance of environmental response of class A, B. . . a′(t), b′(t), . . . The sound of the impact for this particular
bounce
SM coordination and
environmental
response tuple
Simultaneous occurrence of SM coordination a(t) ∈ A
and corresponding environmental trajectory a′(t) ∈ A′ in
the coupled system.
<a, a′>
The set of all tuples <a, a′>. A × A′
Sensorimotor
organization or
sequence scheme
Sensorimotor strategy. A sequence of SM coordination
classes (and their corresponding environmental
projections).
O: A × A′ →
B × B′ → . . .
→ A × A′
Ball bouncing sequence of coordinations that
includes pushing the object towards the
ground, hearing the impact, waiting for its
return, preparing muscles for contact,
absorbing the impact and pushing it back.
Assimilation of A′ by A
in O
(1) Stability condition: all a′(t) ∈ A′ are environmental
responses corresponding to SM coordinations a(t) ∈ A.
Or simply: all a(t) are true SM coordinations.
(2) Transition condition: all a(t) ∈ A are special SM
coordinations, namely reliable transients leading to the
next scheme in O (e.g., B).
Continuous, stable ball bouncing despite
small variations in motor pattern or wind
speeds
Accommodation of Y′
into O by A
Parametric changes that re-establish a closed set of
schemes O or O1 such that Y′ becomes the
environmental projection of the whole system when
engaged in A, which is a scheme belonging to
organization O. This can involve modifying the previous A
or creating a new scheme A1 and integrating it into O.
Learning to bounce a ball on a slope
Lacuna: perturbation of
SM scheme due to a
“gap” in understanding
Violation of the transition condition. Something is
manifestly “unknown” about the world, since the
presumed “right” handling of the situation (A × A′) does
not lead to the next stage in the cycle (B × B′).
Bouncing a ball on a slope for the first time.
Ball does not return to the same position.
Obstacle: perturbation
of SM scheme due to
contradictions and
disturbances.
Violation of the stability condition. Something in the
sensorimotor coordination has failed where in the past it
used to work.
Attempting to bounce a new ball that is
significantly heavier than the one that had
been accommodated. Bouncing demands
more strength.
Equilibration: ongoing
adaptive process
involving assimilation
and accommodation
that stabilizes the
totality of SM schemes
against perturbations by
an ever changing
environment (lacunae,
obstacles) and internal
tensions.
A potentially never ending series of parametric changes
of the totality of SM organization, aimed at maximizing
the stability of each organization against violations of the
transition and stability conditions resulting from
environmental perturbations or internal tensions.
The process of learning to bounce the ball
under a variety of conditions (size and weight
of the ball, slope and friction of the floor,
etc.).
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The agent and the environment are two coupled systems,
i.e., some parameters in each of these systems are affected by
the state of at least some variables in the other. Throughout
the following analysis we will focus on two lower dimensional
projections of the full coupled system: one projection looking
at the state of the agent’s sensorimotor variables (S and M),
and another projection looking at the sub-set of environmental
variables that have a direct effect on the agent (E). The variables
in the sensorimotor projections are affected by other variables
belonging to the agent as well as by variables in the environmental
projection. And similarly for the environment. In other words,
these projections do not describe the whole agent-environment
system. Those agent variables (say hormonal state, neural activity)
that are not directly coupled to the environment, and similarly the
environmental variables that are not directly coupled to the agent,
are not expressed explicitly, though of course they may impact the
sensorimotor process.
Let us consider an equilibrated sensorimotor organization,
which we will denote as O = A × A′ → B × B′ → C × C′ → A
× A′, where the notation A× A′ indicates a combined state in the
cycle involving sensorimotor variables in A and the corresponding
co-occurring environmental variables in A′. Dynamically speak-
ing, each class of sensorimotor coordination (A, B, C) involves
establishing structured patterns of motor and sensor co-variation
in a task-related context. These can take the form of a reliable
transient (one that will likely occur in the right conditions) or a
metastable set of states a(t) that fulfils the condition of belonging
to the same sensorimotor class, i.e., a(t)∈A. The class A is defined
as those sensorimotor trajectories that assimilate those aspects of
the environment that contribute to generating trajectories that
belong to A′. We now clarify what this means.
We shall say that a sensorimotor coordination in class A
assimilates an environmental feature or process that contributes
to producing environmental time-varying states a′ ∈ A′ when the
following two conditions apply (see Figure 1, left):
1. Stability condition: a sensorimotor pattern a = a(t), a ∈ A
occurring in conjunction with an environmental pattern a′ =
a′(t), a′ ∈ A′ are mutually stabilized, i.e., the full agent-
environment coupling does not produce sensorimotor or envi-
ronmental states outside the respective sets.
2. Transition condition: if any combination of trajectories a and
a′ in the coupled system is produced such that a ∈ A and a′
∈ A′, then this leads in time to the production of sensorimotor
pattern b = b(t), b ∈ B in the agent and the production of states
b′ = b′(t), b′ ∈ B′ in the environment, where B× B′ is the next
stage in the cycle.
These conditions are then applicable to other links in the
chain, so that as the agent approaches a state in B and the
environment approaches some state in B′, these states tend to
stabilize each other (condition 1) and lead the coupled system to
the next stage (condition 2).
As a shorthand we will sometimes describe the class of sensori-
motor coordinations A as assimilating the class of environmental
features A′.
Notice that because the dynamical systems description is for-
mulated without assuming a clear delimitation into well-defined
FIGURE 1 | Left: Illustration of the two conditions describing assimilation.
Condition 1: stability. A trajectory a(t) in the projection of sensorimotor
space (SM) belongs to a set A (sets are represented by gray bands), which
is mutually stabilized in coupling with a trajectory in the relevant projection
(E) of environmental variables a′(t) that belongs to region A′. In other words,
the SM trajectories in the upper panel and the environmental trajectories in
the lower panel are both projections of the whole coupled system onto the
respective subspaces during SM engagements of type A and B. Condition
2: transition. Trajectory a(t) in coupling with a′(t) lead respectively to b(t) ∈ B
and b′(t) ∈ B′, the next stage in the sensorimotor organization O. Right:
Projection of O onto sensory (S) and motor (M) coordinates.
agent or environmental stages (A × A′→ B × B′→), it is more
general than the typically staged Piagetian style (A× A′→ B; B×
B′ →) (Piaget, 1975, p. 10). In other words, since the dynamical
interpretation assumes a necessary coupling between agent and
environment, neither behavioral (as suggested by Piaget’s nota-
tion) nor environmental consequences alone are taken to be solely
responsible for transitioning to the next SM coordination within
a given SM organization. The Piagetian case is a particular version
of the dynamical description where the coupled system produces
a clear behavioral outcome b ∈ B which is later co-responsible
(in combination with the environment’s intrinsic dynamics) for
the production of a state b′ belonging to the assimilated envi-
ronmental set B′. This staged mode does not need to occur in
all circumstances nor is it essential for interpreting assimilation
dynamically.
Graphically the sensorimotor organization O can be repre-
sented as a set of closed loops when the coupled system is
projected onto the space of sensorimotor coordinates (Figure 1,
right). Each loop is not necessarily identical to the others because
assimilation implies that the agent’s sensorimotor activity will
keep on cycling through the equivalent sensorimotor states a ∈ A,
b ∈ B, and c ∈ C in equilibrated coupling via conditions 1 and 2,
with environmental states a′ ∈ A′, b′ ∈ B′ and c′ ∈ C′ respectively
(Figure 1, left). We take the bundle of all these possible trajectories
as the graphical description of the cycle O. The gray areas then
represent the different sets A, B, C (and A′, B′ in Figure 1 left). In
the dynamical formulation, the distinction between stages must
somehow be pre-given and related to meaningfully distinct (at
least from the agent’s or the observer’s perspective) sensorimotor
engagements (suckling, swallowing, breathing, etc.). In other
words, the difference between sensorimotor engagements A and B
is defined externally to what is shown in this figure. The shape and
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extent of the gray areas, however, is defined by meeting the condi-
tions 1 and 2 in a way that a closed cycle is formed (Notice that the
gray areas are drawn as smooth and continuous for illustration
purposes; in general the sets A, B, . . . and A′, B′, . . . need not
have obvious topological properties in sensorimotor coordinates).
In dynamical terms, in this representation, the organization O
corresponds to a metastable region in sensorimotor space. We
assume that equilibration has been maximized if cycles occur
within the gray band.
Let us now consider accommodation. A perturbation to the
sensorimotor organization O implies that a situation has occurred
that locally, at some point in the cycle, does not fulfill either
condition 1 or 2. In these cases the environmental dynamics are
not assimilated by the agent.
This can happen, for instance, when the stability condition (1)
fails: during the A × A′ situation, and for reasons that can orig-
inate in internal or environmental processes, the sensorimotor
trajectory a ∈ A and the environmental trajectory a′ ∈ A′, or both,
become unstable (i.e., they fall outside their respective assimilated
sets). This leads either the agent or the environment, or both, to
trajectories outside the assimilated sets: d /∈ A and/or d′ /∈ A′. The
agent experiences this as an obstacle; something in the relation
between environmental variables and the enacted sensorimotor
coordination has failed where in the past it used to work.
Alternatively, the perturbation may occur when the transition
to the next stage in the cycle fails (condition 2). Even if a ∈ A
and a′ ∈ A′ are both within their respective sets A and A′, the
conditions of the coupling change such that instead of leading to b
∈ B they lead to e /∈ B and/or instead of leading to b′ ∈ B′ they lead
to e′ /∈ B′. This is the case of a lacuna, i.e., something is manifestly
unknown about the world since the presumed “right” handling
of the situation (A × A′) does not lead “as expected” to the next
stage in the cycle.
Notice that the dynamical interpretation is based on the prop-
erties of the agent-environment coupling, i.e., on the relation
between the agent and the environment. Then a particular failure
(in conditions 1 or 2) can in principle originate from either
internal or environmental proximal causes. The origin of a per-
turbation is invisible to the agent, only its effect is manifested as
a disruption of the sensorimotor scheme: the loss of “control”
over a previously stable sensorimotor coupling or the failure of
an effectively achieved coupling to lead to its usual result. The
terms obstacle and lacuna are used here for their relational effects
on action and perception, not for their (not directly perceivable)
proximal causes.
If we assume that the gray areas in Figure 1 represent trajec-
tories belonging to the condition of having achieved maximal
equilibrium and that these trajectories define the subsets A, B,
and C (and a similar condition of maximal equilibration defines
the sets A′, B′ and C′ on the environmental side), then any
perturbation as defined above (either an obstacle or lacuna) will
make sensorimotor and environmental trajectories escape from
their sets of maximal equilibration (the gray zone). And, all
other things remaining equal, in principle, it cannot be expected
to return to the gray zone, except fortuitously, for instance,
through an independent environmental change. Anything that at
the personal level could be described as an attempt to deal with
an obstacle or lacuna, i.e., an attempt to bring the unexpected
situation back into the sensorimotor organization O, will imply
at the dynamical, subpersonal level that things do not remain
equal—i.e., that some form of plastic change must occur.
Both the agent and the environment, as dynamical systems,
are described by a set of variables and a set of constraints and
parameters. We call this latter set R for the agent and R′ for the
environment. A coupling, as we have said, implies that at least
some of the parameters in one system depend on the state of the
variables in the other. But other processes apart from the coupling
may also drive parametrical changes and we refer to these as
processes of explicit plasticity.
For accommodation to occur in the conditions we have
described, some form of explicit plasticity is needed. Contrary to
what is traditionally assumed, it is possible for a system to exhibit
adaptation, learning and other history-dependent behaviors with-
out explicit plasticity (e.g., Izquierdo et al., 2008). Those forms
of adaptive behavior rely on the rich dynamical possibilities of
systems with sufficiently high dimensionality. Such systems learn
by selecting different regions of their dynamical landscape in a
history-dependent manner, a form of implicit “plasticity”. Thus,
agents controlled by dynamical neural networks can perform
some forms of learning and history-dependent categorization
without any changes to the structure of these networks (e.g.,
to the connection weights). In our description, such systems
would by themselves, without the need for parametrical change,
already assimilate what may look like a perturbation at the local,
immediate timescale. Externally, and with respect to the timescale
of behavior the agent is seen as “perturbed” and then adapting
to this “perturbation”. But on a sufficiently long timescale, in
the absence of explicit plastic changes, a reliable (not fortuitous)
return back into the sensorimotor scheme O implies that the
original “perturbation” was not such, and had been assimilated all
along, only that this did not seem to be the case at the timescale
of observation.
In principle, plasticity may occur on the agent’s side or in
the environment (either in R or R′). Let us denote as <z,z′>
the simultaneous occurrence of sensorimotor trajectory z and
environmental trajectory z′ in the coupled system. The set of all
tuples <z,z′> corresponds to Piaget’s notation Z × Z′. Thus, by
the notation <z,z′> ∈ Z× Z′ we simply mean that in addition to
occurring simultaneously during coupling, z ∈Z and z′ ∈Z′. Con-
sider, for instance, the case of a lacuna, a failure in the transition
A× A′→ B× B′. This means that, after producing <a,a′> ∈ A×
A′, a new combined state <e,e′> is produced where at least one of
the following conditions is true: e /∈ B or e′ /∈ B′. This breaks down
the cycle. Let’s suppose that, on attempting the same transition
again, a plastic change has the effect of producing a different
sensorimotor transformation <a,a′>→ <b1,b′1> such that the
new environmental trajectory b′1 is now produced instead of e′ and
a new sensorimotor coordination b1 is produced instead of e. We
assume that like e, b1 /∈ B or that like e′, b′1 /∈ B′, i.e., either the new
sensorimotor trajectory or the new environmental trajectory, or
both, are still outside the previously assimilated set. However, let’s
assume that unlike the combination <e,e′> now the combination
<b1,b′1> does lead back to <c,c′> ∈ C × C′. Then the factors
that lead to the new trajectory b′1 have been accommodated. If
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the accommodation does not disturb the already assimilated set
B′ (which may or may not be the case), then the set B′1 = B′ ∪ b′1
defines the newly assimilated environmental conditions and B1 =
B ∪ b1 the accommodating class of sensorimotor coordination.
The new organization is now O1 = A× A′→ B1 × B′1→ C× C′→ A × A′. In longer sensorimotor schemes a return to the cycle
may occur at a later point in which case the sets describing the
intermediate links need to be redefined accordingly. The case of
an obstacle can be treated similarly (plasticity would be involved
in transforming the new situation <e,e′> into <b1, b′1> such that
b1 and b′1 reliably stabilize each other within the accommodated
new set B1 × B′1).
In Piagetian descriptions, accommodation seems always to
imply plastic changes in the agent and not in the environment.
This is fitting since Piaget is interested in human development
starting from its biological roots. However, it is interesting to
note that we often equilibrate our sensorimotor operations by
modifying the environment (or indeed that other agents con-
tribute to our equilibration). Like most species we are active
constructors of our environments, either purposefully or not. If
it is too cold to perform our activities outdoors, we accommodate
this obstacle by wearing warmer clothes, not by growing fur. And
there may be a range of less obvious cases where the agent’s
activity is not directly aimed at transforming the environment
but such transformations occur nonetheless—e.g., the formation
of trails on grass, the emergent spatial ordering of work spaces
(Agre, 1997; Kirsh, 1995, 1996), and so on. In the rest of this
section we stay on the agent’s side to keep things simple and
because it fits the traditional Piagetian interpretation. However,
the analysis permits equally well the consideration of cases in
which accommodation occurs by the agent inducing environmen-
tal plasticity such that the sensorimotor patterns are modified
without requiring any physical alteration to the organization of
the agent itself.
How should changes in the set of parameters R occur? What
triggers them? These are important questions that will largely
depend on the case in question. Ashby’s (1960) general for-
mulation postulates that these changes could happen at ran-
dom as soon as they are triggered by the mismatch between
the current situation and the acceptable (equilibrated) set of
possible agent-environment states. In such a scheme, random
changes in the parameters R governing the agent’s sensorimotor
coupling with the world would lead to exploration of the space
of possible SM coordinations, and this process would terminate
only when re-equilibration is achieved. It is clear that natu-
ral adaptive behavior uses more sophisticated strategies about
which we can say little in general terms here. But we can
affirm one implication that arises from our formal description:
accommodation always involves an element of randomness. If
this was not the case perturbations could not occur since we
have assumed maximal equilibration ex hypothesi. Moreover, if a
sure, deterministic accommodating strategy exists and the agent
can deploy such a strategy, this means that the “perturbation”
had been assimilated all along as the closure of the cycle was
guaranteed (although by external standards it may look as if
the agent is struggling to accommodate a new environmental
feature). Therefore, open-ended accommodation implies some
degree of random search in how internal parameters are affected
and/or randomness in how the environment responds to these
parametrical changes.
If and when accommodation has only additive effects, i.e., they
add to the set of assimilated states without subtracting previously
assimilated conditions from the previous sets, then maximal
equilibration is conserved. If not, maximal equilibration may be
re-attained through a sequence of accommodation steps (learning
the new but also re-learning the old). One might assume that the
meta-stable situation that defines the sensorimotor organization
would imply a tendency towards maximizing equilibration. This
is not necessarily the case and will depend on the strategy used to
regulate plasticity.
In practice, in many cases we witness a tendency towards
maximal equilibration as learning progresses. This tendency can
be measured by dynamical signatures, for instance by studying
long terms correlations (e.g., van Orden et al., 2003; Dotov et al.,
2010). Such measures are indicative of the degree of fluency
in sensorimotor engagements and other important aspects, for
instance whether the action is more driven by the agent or by the
environment.
Earlier, we have linked the Piagetian sensorimotor organiza-
tion or scheme with the dynamical concept of sensorimotor strat-
egy (Buhrmann et al., 2013). The latter, as we have said, allows for
complex spatiotemporal relations between partial sensorimotor
coordinations, which in Piagetian terms would be subsumed as
a sequence of states in a totality. Without radically altering the
present analysis, we can account for Piaget’s second type of equili-
bration (between sensorimotor coordinations), by simply noting
that plasticity in the agent may occur not only in parameters that
regulate the sensorimotor coordinations themselves, but also their
inter-relation as defined by a sensorimotor strategy (e.g., relative
timing, duration and intensity). In fact, it seems unlikely that
in complex adaptive systems, a parametrical change would affect
only one sensorimotor coordination without affecting others. The
condition of equilibration in such cases would not necessarily
be a return to some later segment of the original cycle, but a
mutual accommodation of the various elements of the sensori-
motor strategy with respect to each other; a transformation of the
scheme as a whole.
Figure 2 illustrates the foregoing analysis. Panel 1 shows a
maximally equilibrated organization O and one given trajectory
within the gray zone that defines it. A perturbation occurs (panel
2) such that the coupled system moves away from the maximally
equilibrated area. A series of plastic changes are induced with the
result that the trajectory comes back in some areas to the original
cycle. As further accommodation events occur the new scheme
O1 may become maximally equilibrated again (panel 3). Here
we also show an additional possibility. It may happen that new
metastable regions can be discovered by the plastic exploration
of sensorimotor couplings while the system is in the process
of accommodating the original perturbation. This will result in
the creation of a new sensorimotor organization O2 without the
disappearance of the modified original one O1. This organization
may not be initially maximally equilibrated but, in the right
circumstances may increasingly approach this condition. This
difference is graphically illustrated as the difference between the
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FIGURE 2 | Accommodation and equilibration. Top left: a maximally
equilibrated sensorimotor organization O; a trajectory in sensorimotor
space is shown within the gray band defined by O. Top right: a perturbation
brings the sensorimotor trajectory outside the gray band, however, due to
plastic changes, the trajectory is accommodated and a cycle restored.
Bottom left: through repeated perturbations and re-equilibrations, the
organization O has been turned into O1 and another organization O2 has
been equilibrated, they correspond now to two different kinds of
sensorimotor engagements. Bottom right: O2 attains maximal equilibration
(represented graphically as a smoother trajectory that does not leave the
gray band) and O1 has been re-shaped due to a mutual accommodation
between the two clearly distinct sensorimotor schemes.
jagged loop in panel 3 and the smooth loop in panel 4 (although
this is merely a convention; in some cases equilibration could
indeed look jagged in the plot and still be maximal).
In terms of our previous example, O could correspond to the
sensorimotor breastfeeding cycle (Figure 2, panel 1). A pertur-
bation occurs (panel 2), for instance, the first attempt at feeding
from a milk bottle. The breastfeeding cycle serves here as the
departure point for accommodating the new situation. Through
plastic changes and “re-use” or adjustment of sensorimotor ele-
ments in the breastfeeding cycle (e.g., the baby changing the
relative timing, duration and intensity of suckling, swallowing
and breathing), the milk bottle is accommodated for the first time.
Through further disequilibrium and subsequent accommodation,
the milk bottle cycle begins to be maximally accommodated. A
separate gray area begins to be defined (panel 3), which cor-
responds to new milk-bottle feeding sensorimotor scheme O2.
The breastfeeding scheme remains, though possibly modified
in shape (O1). There may be some “interaction” between the
two organizations (higher order equilibrations as described by
Piaget) through mutual accommodation. O1 is likely to be shaped
differently, as O2 becomes maximally equilibrated (panel 4) but
the details of this higher-level plastic process are not described
here.
We now come back to the example mentioned earlier of the
visual inversions studied by Kohler (1951 [1964]), and try to
interpret his behavioral and phenomenological reports in terms
of processes of equilibration (though for reasons of space not in
the amount of detail this exercise would merit). Kohler’s main
finding was that re-adaptation of the visual field always occurs
only partially and step-wise. The first successful adaptations,
required it seems for any subsequent correction of the visual
experience, are always those involving co-occurring non-visual
(e.g., tactile) sensations and/or overt bodily interactions. Thus
walking, avoiding obstacles, reaching etc. become increasingly
better and eventually almost perfect, while the visual experience
itself is still judged to be non-veridical. After such skills are
recovered, this is usually followed by recognition of objects that
can be “brought into a new behavioral relationship with one’s
body” (ibid. p. 158), such as one’s face seen in the mirror, or one’s
shadow projected on the floor. Adaptation of visual experience
is equally fragmented: objects might appear in the correct place,
yet remain mirrored in orientation (the position and direction of
movement of a car is perceived correctly, while the letters on its
license plate remain reversed). This fragmentation of the skill of
seeing led Kohler to interpret his experiments as a means to probe
the transformation of “the structure and mutual interweaving of
[perceptual] habits” (ibid. p. 139), and the process of adaptation
as one of rehabituation.
Identifying “perceptual habits” (ibid. p. 140) with senso-
rimotor strategies and rehabituation with equilibration allows
us to find further similarities. Firstly, new attempts at equili-
bration always depart from what is already known, i.e., from
existing SM coordinations. During rehabituation this results in
a failure to grasp objects or move in the intended direction,
since there is now a mismatch (lacuna or obstable in Piagetian
terms) between vision, proprioception and intended movement.
Interestingly, conscious strategies for controlling (compensat-
ing) fast grasping movements are not successful or stable in
the long run. Kohler reports that in the end only repeated
and essentially random reach attempts eventually lead to the
gradual adjustment of movements and the co-occuring visual
experience, supporting our requirement for randomness in the
exploration of new SM coordinations. Secondly, adaptations
always seem to be task-specific, i.e., progressive trials are guided
towards achieving closure of some kind (e.g., reaching the object).
Equilibration also occurs gradually. The first cases of success
are often unstable until equilibration is maximized and new
metastable SM schemes are fully formed. There also exists a
“particular splitting in the difficulty or ease of correct mas-
tery” (ibid. p. 144) of different visually-guided actions: equi-
libration in one task does not transfer to others. The kind
of left-right perceptual habits involved in walking or cycling
are different from those used in reading letters, for example.
Each perceptual skill is mastered by undergoing an equilibra-
tion process of its own. And only when all tensions between
individual SM schemes are resolved, i.e., after appropriate re-
equilibration (or equilibration of the second and third cate-
gory), is the world as a whole perceived as coherent, i.e., correct
vision re-established (though this may never be fully achieved in
practice).
Another useful example is learning to bounce a ball under
different conditions. This example and a summary of the different
dynamical concepts introduced appear in Table 1.
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PRINCIPLES FOR SENSORIMOTOR EQUILIBRATION
Even though the language of equilibration might seem rather
specific, the dynamical interpretation provided earlier allows us
to extract a number of general principles and requirements that
we believe apply to any approach to learning new sensorimotor
categories in an open-ended manner.
To begin with, SM coordinations form equivalence classes. Our
definition of the stability and transition conditions for assimi-
lation implies the possibility for different SM coordinations to
contribute to the closure of a SM organization. The equivalence
of SM coordinations need not be identifiable topologically (in SM
space). Instead, it is established solely by their playing equal roles
in the completion of a sensorimotor task.
Learning agents need to be able to quickly respond to varying
environmental situations. This requires that they never reach
stable equilibrium. SM coordinations, therefore, must only be
temporarily “stable”, or meta-stable. This is accounted for in
our requirement that each SM coordination leads naturally to
another, i.e., in the transition condition (and similarly it must
also be possible to move between higher-level SM organizations
in an itinerant manner). Reliable SM organizations, given their
dependence on equivalent classes of SM coordinations, and not
on specific SM trajectories, are therefore “stable” not in the
mathematical sense, but internally coherent: i.e., they lead to
the continued renewal of the SM organization itself (in the case
analyzed here, the SM organization loop or scheme).
Also, in order to respond appropriately to different environ-
mental contexts, mechanisms of selection are needed to choose
which SM scheme to enact in a given situation. Random selection
might be necessary in situations never encountered before, and
might underlie the exploration of new SM coordinations during
equilibration. But more directed choices could develop as well.
This need not be based on abstract deliberation or decision-
making. Dynamical mechanisms that allow environmental condi-
tions to “call for” a certain SM engagement are also imaginable
(Buhrmann and Di Paolo, 2014). Also, in the same way that
certain SM coordinations naturally follow each other within a
circular organization, there might be propensities for some orga-
nizations to be followed by certain others. For instance, a sucking
reflex might usually be preceded by an organization that guides
the baby’s attention in the necessary direction, like the rooting
reflex during the first 4 months, which in turn might be preceded
by an organization that seeks proximity to the mother and so on.
Another possibility might involve the similarity of SM schemes
(and/or environmental conditions), such that similar but different
schemes can be tried in similar contexts. This would also work
through hierarchical organization of SM schemes without requir-
ing a quantitative similarity measure. For example, if through
accommodation a new bottle-sucking scheme is established that
in turn derives from a previous breast-feeding scheme, then
both schemes together could form a higher-level class of sucking
schemes.
Accommodation involves normative evaluation of SM
schemes. Firstly, this is required for assessing when an assimilation
attempt has failed and whether adaptive processes need to be
triggered. Secondly, in the process of accommodation, new
engagements need to be evaluated as better or worse than the
failed one, in order to determine which adaptations to fixate
in the system. There may be multiple sources of normative
evaluation, including external ones, consider the situation of an
apprentice being guided to improve her movements. But, as a
principle, it is necessary to have a least some internal sources
of normativity (e.g., survival, closure of SM scheme) in order
for the agent to evaluate situations in which externally imposed
norms (e.g., a designer’s utility function or value system) break
down or cease to apply. An exclusive reliance on external norms
and value systems in models of learning by definition imposes
limitations on the universe of learnable behaviors (i.e., they
are restricted to those possibilities considered by the externally
imposed value system) and therefore are an impediment to
open-ended learning.
Accommodation also requires adaptive mechanisms for modi-
fying existing SM coordinations. An important Piagetian princi-
ple is that accommodation always starts from some pre-existing
sensorimotor scheme, which undergoes adaptation if it cannot
assimilate a given environmental feature. In order to achieve this
goal, random “mutations” (i.e., generation of new potential SM
schemes) are in principle required for true open-ended learning
(in addition to more guided forms of learning). Otherwise, a
system cannot, even potentially, transcend its current “laws”
of operation. The randomness in question need not involve
complete, but only partial, statistical independence from the
previous state (see also Campbell, 1974). “Motor babbling” is
one example of randomness creating new interactions with the
environment. But while randomness is required for true open-
ended learning, it will typically not be the most efficient route
to learning in those cases which are recognizably similar to what
has been encountered before. In such cases, a perceiver can also
learn from the way she fails. Directed learning could rely, for
instance, on gradients in the normative evaluation of SMCs,
or on the discrepancy between a scheme’s actual and expected
outcomes.
Finally, in a complex system involving many different SM
organizations, e.g., in the case of hierarchically organized SM
structures, the accommodation of one scheme might interfere
with others established previously (analogous to the stability-
plasticity dilemma in traditional learning theory). Not only must
accommodation produce valid SM schemes, but these are also
subject to a more global coherence constraint. In other words,
equilibration does not only involve adaptation of individual SM
schemes, but also the re-equilibration of the SM repertoire as a
whole.
In sum, the building blocks of open-ended learning, according
to the approach presented here, are meaningful SM coordinations
(rather than, say, individual SM states). We learn to perceive and
interact with something never before encountered through equi-
libration of an organization of such SM coordinations. Through
a process of incremental, adaptive differentiation of existing
SM coordinations—bootstrapped by simple sensorimotor loops
either already present at the earliest stages of development or
discovered through self-organizing processes (e.g., Marques et al.,
2013)—previously established SM know-how is adapted to a
new context, or new patterns of interaction are generated and
integrated with an already existing set of SM schemes.
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DISCUSSION
At this point we have established two important results. Firstly,
Piaget’s theory of equilibration can be formulated in dynamical
systems terms, and in those terms it is compatible with the
operational notions of dynamic SMCs established previously
by Buhrmann et al. (2013). Secondly, this dynamical version
of Piaget’s ideas furnishes SMC theory with its missing theory
of learning, and from there, with the chance to keep develop-
ing its conceptual primitive of “mastery”. In this section, we
discuss two general implications of these results, i.e., implica-
tions of the principles gleaned from the dynamical formulation
and implications for the personal-level experience of perceptual
learning.
IMPLICATIONS FOR OPEN-ENDED LEARNING
Several of the principles for open-ended learning discussed above
are already present in other approaches. Ashby, for example, in
his concept of ultrastability (Ashby, 1960), formulated perhaps
the first mechanistic account of open-ended learning, namely
as the random exploration of a large space of sensorimotor
loops with the aim of achieving homeostatic equilibrium (for
use of this idea in more recent work also see Di Paolo, 2000,
2003, 2010; Harvey et al., 2005; Iizuka and Di Paolo, 2007,
2008; Di Paolo and Iizuka, 2008; Manicka and Di Paolo, 2009;
Izquierdo et al., 2013). Parallels with reinforcement learning
(Sutton and Barto, 2009) and related sensorimotor approaches
(e.g., Duff et al., 2011; Maye and Engel, 2011, 2013) can be
drawn as well. For instance, the exploration-exploitation trade-
off characteristic of such approaches is related to the assimilation-
accommodation dichotomy in equilibration; and the global equi-
librium towards which these systems tend is one of maxi-
mum expected reward, in analogy with the state of maximum
equilibration.
However, equilibration differs from these approaches in cru-
cial ways. Ashby’s (1960) ultrastability, for example, fails to
account for more directed and efficient types of adaptation (other
than randomness), and, at least in its original formulation, is at
odds with the incremental nature of equilibration, according to
which learning always starts from where you are now and tends to
conserve previously learned behavior for small accommodations.
Piaget’s account also distinguishes itself from other approaches
in that learning is not seen as the discovery of existing structure
in a pre-given space of perception-action states. It is rather the
open-ended, combinatorial-like construction of new SM coordi-
nations in an ever growing space of possible SM coordinations.
Equilibration is thus more akin to the evolutionary radiation
of species that leads to the ever-branching phylogenetic tree, or
to selectionist adaptation in the immune system, which enables
production of new antibodies for virtually every possible antigen.
As Kauffman has noted (Kauffman, 2002; Longo et al., 2012), the
space of solutions created by such mechanisms is “unprestatable”,
in the sense that one cannot ahead of time determine the set of all
possible SM coordinations a person might produce in the course
of her life.
This open-endedness of Piagetian equilibration is in part due
to the fact that most SM engagements will only become available
in a history-dependent manner, when other SM engagements
have been discovered that they depend on (like pre-adaptations
in evolution). Very likely such a system will be non-ergodic
(see also Kauffman, 2002). It will only ever visit such a
small part of its “state space”, i.e., produce only the smallest
number of SM coordinations out of all possible ones, that
it would be on a unique trajectory (though commonalities
in embodiment, social constraints etc. might limit this space
somewhat).
Additionally, equilibration is open-ended because the world
itself provides an open-ended repertoire of possible “behavioral
niches”. There is no predictable end to the variety of physical
couplings offered by the world. This is to be highlighted because,
as we have argued, the world is a constitutive part of SM coordi-
nations. It is not the agent’s learning architecture that is open-
ended per se, but only in virtue of its capacity of coupling to
an open-ended world. This is a point which can be seen more
clearly in a dynamical analysis of SMCs, rather than in an account
based on manipulation of internal representational states. In the
dynamical perspective, the world plays a role in learning which
is different from that of providing inputs to internal processing.
Nothing in the formalism prevents aspects of the dynamics of
the world forming constitutive parts of the learnt sensorimotor
schemes, and indeed this is exactly what we see happening in
implemented models. Aguilera et al. (2013) provide a strong
example of the difference between world-coupling and world-
as-input. Similar effects have been registered in models of social
coupling (Di Paolo et al., 2008) analogous to situations like
the double TV-monitor experiment by Murray and Trevarthen
(1985) (see De Jaegher et al., 2010 for the social cognition
implications of these models analogous to the point we are
making here).
It should be noted, that at this stage the dynamical systems
approach to sensorimotor equilibration is not a fully developed
theory. It outlines the essential elements that such a theory will
eventually have to contain, but several details, for example regard-
ing its possible implementation, have yet to be filled in. Progress in
this area will need to involve further work on the nature of open-
ended learning, for instance further examination of the processes
assumed to be open-ended in nature (such as biological evolution
and the adaptive immune system) and their relation to processes
that could be operating in the brain (e.g., Edelman, 1987; Calvin,
1997; Fernando et al., 2012).
Future work should also be aimed at identifying empirical
evidence supporting the dynamical formulation of SM equi-
libration. In this regard, the history-dependent nature of this
process suggests that it is necessary to study individual subjects’
learning trajectories as a function of their pre-existing behavioral
repertoire. A good example is the study by Kostrubiec et al.
(2012), in which dynamical systems analysis is used to describe
different subjects’ strategies in learning a new sensorimotor skill.
The authors find that the routes of learning, i.e., the dynamical
adaptations involved, depend on the relevant SM coordinations
each individual learner brings to the learning task. The observed
adaptations are either small incremental modifications of an exist-
ing SM coordination, if it is similar enough to the coordination
that is to be learned, or otherwise abrupt bifurcations that qual-
itatively change the underlying SM repertoire and create novel
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forms of SM coordination. In further support of the equilibration
approach, the authors also show that the stability of the desired
coordination, rather than detected errors in performance, can
serve to guide sensorimotor learning. In general, new methods of
investigation might be needed to study the development of non-
ergodic systems whose qualitative properties change over time
(see e.g., Molenaar and Campbell, 2009; Medaglia et al., 2011).
PERCEPTUAL LEARNING AT THE PERSONAL LEVEL
The dictionary notion of “mastery” is ambiguous. On the one
hand, it can refer to “comprehensive knowledge or skill”; on the
other, it can refer to the process of mastering such a skill. We
have given an operational account of how sensorimotor schemes
emerge and get transformed through the process of equilibration.
How does this relate to both notions of mastery? The first thing
to notice is that mastery as used in SMC theory is a personal
level notion, i.e., achieving skills in accord with personal level
norms. Therefore, to fully address this issue we need to investigate
the links between the dynamical approach to equilibration and
the personal level. This task is part of a larger project, which we
cannot fully address here, but nevertheless we wish to suggest
some links.
A further issue at the personal level is raised by our initial
way of posing the problem of perceptual learning in relation
to understanding. Understanding is something done by whole
agents. For example, we have emphasized above that, in mastering
the modified SMCs of inverting goggles, the subject needs to be
involved in working out and understanding their new situation.
Once again, we see that a full answer to this issue will involve
working out an extended account, which explains how the norms
and goals of a whole agent arise from multiple, interdependent
sensorimotor structures (Beaton, 2013, 2014).
Here, we wish to make two points as regards further work
on these two issues. Firstly, we believe that a full, personal story
is compatible with the framework presented here. Secondly, we
think that looking at what we cannot yet say about the whole-
agent story helps to highlight where future work can be carried
out in the operational story. In particular, we note that a real
subject does not consist of one, or a few, sensorimotor loops
as studied above, but instead has a vast number of interact-
ing sensorimotor abilities, all at different levels of complex-
ity, and which must all eventually be grounded in biological
viability.
These issues are touched on in Piaget’s work, where he
talks about accommodation and assimilation between different
schemes of understanding, and also about the accommodation
and assimilation between a given scheme and the whole frame-
work of understanding of the agent. However (see e.g., Boom,
2009, p.138), Piaget never explored these second and third types
of equilibration in anything like the detail in which he explored
equilibration of his first type, namely between a given senso-
rimotor scheme and the world. Similarly, in the present work,
we ourselves have so far considered only sensorimotor equili-
bration of a given sensorimotor scheme (a loop which perhaps
splits into two), and we have not considered the different levels
of stability that arise when multiple sensorimotor schemes are
in interaction. To deal with learning at the level of a whole
agent, these much more complex interactions must eventually be
addressed.
Is the only question here one of complexity, or are other issues
raised? We note that according to the sensorimotor approach,
perception is always informed not just by the enactment of a
sensorimotor skill (i.e., a closed sensorimotor scheme) but also
by the set of potential skills which the subject already possesses,
which may be relevant to the current situation. Consider, for
example, two agents each of which has a feeding sensorimotor
scheme which, when analyzed operationally, have the same sen-
sorimotor stages and structures (same SM coordinations A, B,
C, leading to the same environmental responses A′, B′, C′, same
transitions, and so on). One of these agents has only this behavior,
the other has in addition a repertoire of many other skills which
can be engaged in different contexts. The sensorimotor approach
suggests that the structure of perception is different (potentially
much richer) in the latter agent than the former even when
they are both engaged in the same behavior. This suggests that
further examining the relation between the operational and the
personal levels is not simply a matter of complexity but that we
can expect qualitative differences when considering the agent as
a whole.
Returning to the issue of mastery, we suggest that the full-
blown, personal level term will be closely related to Piaget’s
concept of equilibration. Equilibration refers to the full process
of closing a sensorimotor scheme, and then progressively “stabi-
lizing” that closed loop against perturbations. Thus, equilibration
itself shows a close analogy with the two meanings of mastery:
having, and improving, a sensorimotor skill. However, we suggest
that, if mastery is read as a personal level notion, then giving a full
account of mastery will depend on two things: further operational
work on the interaction between actual (enacted) and potential
sensorimotor structures, and further operational work on the
grounding of sensorimotor norms in the biological normativity
of the agent as a whole (c.f. Noë, 2004, p. 230).
CONCLUSION
We have proposed a conceptual framework for understanding
open-ended perceptual learning in the context of a missing theory
of learning for the sensorimotor approach to perception. The
proposal is inspired by Piaget’s theory of equilibration, but has
been given a novel dynamical treatment and formalization. The
result is fully compatible with sensorimotor theory (including the
previous dynamical analysis given by Buhrmann et al., 2013).
We can now propose precise answers to our opening questions
at the operational level:
• By what mechanisms is mastery of SMCs acquired?
Through the ongoing process of maximizing equilibration in
SM schemes or more generally SM strategies.
• What counts as having acquired sufficient know-how of SMCs?
What counts as mastery?
To achieve a sufficiently equilibrated SM scheme (with most
systematic perturbations accommodated).
• How is it possible to learn to perceive anything new if percep-
tion itself always relies on existing knowledge of SMCs, as the
theory claims?
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Perceptual learning starts from existing SM schemes, which
undergo a process of equilibration in novel conditions. This
may result in a new SM scheme. Once equilibration is achieved
it may proceed by further accommodation until full mastery is
achieved.
• How do various sensorimotor organizations relate to each
other in the same agent?
Through higher-level processes of equilibration between SM
schemes (as illustrated in Figure 2).
• What kind of cognitive organizational principles can help sus-
tain SMCs in a flexible, open-ended manner?
At least these principles: (1) the organization of SM coordi-
nations in equivalence classes; (2) the meta-stability of SM
coordination; (3) the existence of selection mechanisms to
choosing SM schemes; (4) an intrinsic normative evaluation
of the equilibration process; (5) the existence of sufficiently
rich adaptive mechanisms for altering SM coordinations; and
(6) a higher-order re-equilibration mechanism to organize the
relation between various SM schemes.
This does not mean that there are not still several open
issues for further research. For instance, one unresolved question
involves figuring out which plasticity mechanisms underlie the
different stages in equilibration. It should also be noted that
we have examined these questions taking a bottom-up approach
in which an autonomous agent is confronted with obstacles
and lacunae and must establish some re-equilibration following
intrinsic norms. This by no means implies that all learning is like
this, especially human learning. In such cases we cannot ignore
the effects of parental scaffolding, external norms, and the lin-
guistic guidance of others, eventually turning into linguistic self-
guidance. We expect, however, that the bottom-up approach can
serve as a departure point—it will surely not exhaust the issue—
for other dynamical theories of skill acquisition and expertise
that make explicit the passage from higher-level, social, linguistic
and reflexive rules and norms to corporeal intentionality and
habits (e.g., Dreyfus, 2002; Ravaisson, 1838/2008; Merleau-Ponty,
1945/2012).
The proposed framework leads to specific principles required
for open-ended learning. Again, we do not claim this list to be
exhaustive. In particular, we have argued for the importance of
intrinsic norms, and for the ability of a system to, in some sense,
“transcend its own rules”. The Piagetian approach provides an
entry point into both of these aspects of open-ended learning.
On the one hand, it makes intrinsic norms explicit, in terms
of the closure of the sensorimotor scheme. On the other hand,
equilibration proceeds by re-shaping pre-existing structures in
coupling with dynamical regularities from the world (some of
them unknown by the agent). Thereby, a Piagetian agent is never
strictly bound to what is already known, even if this is always its
departure point.
Perceptual learning presents no paradox as soon as the
required mastery is seen not as the accumulation of internal
representations, whose relevance and applicability would escape
the agent in an unknown context. Instead, mastery is a regulated
openness to be coupled to the world and to be guided by it starting
from what has worked in the past. Mastery involves as much
the agent as the world as sources both of meta-stability and of
novelty.
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